The godfather of this category is Hume, and contemporary users are contract theorists such as Gauthier and Rawls, as well as rule-makers like Brandt, Urmson, and Hooker. (Hume`s rather complicated and strange point of view has itself given rise to a small literature, see z.B Pitson 1988; Baier 1992; Gauthier 1992; Cohon 2006 et al.) In the seventeenth century a new strand of moral theory was born that used the idea of mutual agreement or treaty between members of a community as a means of justifying moral principles. This “social contract” movement has also given rise to new approaches to bond note theory, but we should begin our discussion by distinguishing between two different types of projects that have historically occupied social contract theorists. . What does this mean for the existence of agreements that look very much like an agreement and that, strictly speaking, cannot be an agreement? (1940: 265) The conventional approach emphasizes the regularity of the promise. As a result, there is a large amount of work on issues related to rules, games and other aspects of the conceptual framework. One such problem is the adequacy of the metaphor of promise as a game. This debate begins with Rawls` 1955 paper, Two Concepts of Rules. In that paper, Rawls distinguished between what he called the “summary” conception of rules, where rules are only “ground rules,” that is, instructions on behaviors based on reports of previous acts and their results, and the “practical” view of rules that she considers “logic before” for individual cases. An important assertion by Rawls about practical rules is that they do not just regulate action, but are constitutive. The constitutive rules, such as the rules of baseball, are necessary for us to perform (and even understand) game-based actions.
Rawls argues that the promising convention consists of (at least one) constitutive rule, that is, if you say `I promise you` or something like that, you have to do what you say you want.” If a waiting researcher aims to offer a theory that declares guilt without invoking a promising convention or practice (such as Scanlon), then the other standard way to explain trust in promises is blocked. If there is a convention that regulates promises, and if that convention is such that it creates confidence in the promises that promises will keep their promises, then it can be said that promises generate the necessary expectations. . . .